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Civil Code and Related Subjects
PERSONS*
Robert A. Pascalt
Proof of Nullity of Second Marriage
In Lands v. Equitable Life Assurance Co.' the appellant
claimed the proceeds of a policy payable to the "widow" of the
deceased. To establish her claim she gave proof of her marriage
to the deceased in 1956. Brothers of the deceased, entitled to
the proceeds in the absence of a "widow," showed the appellant
had been married to another in 1940. At the trial the appellant
herself admitted she had abandoned her first husband in 1944
or 1945, had never sought a divorce from him, did not know
whether he had ever sought a divorce from her, and did not
know, either at the time of her second marriage or at the time
of the trial, whether her first husband was alive. On this record,
apparently, the trial court denied the appellant's claim and gave
judgment to the deceased's brothers. On appeal the Supreme
Court, relying on the "majority view" as expressed in 35 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, Marriage §§ 195 and 197, declared (1) that
ordinarily a second marriage must be presumed valid until the
person attacking it proves its invalidity, but (2) that "this
presumption should [not] be available to one who has deserted
or abandoned a spouse of a prior marriage... and subsequently
. . . remarries in bad faith and without reason to believe that
the first marriage has been dissolved." 2 The court then elabo-
rated further that "where innocence or good faith is once estab-
lished the burden of proof to show that the first marriage is
still in existence is on the party attacking the second marriage.
However ... if bad faith is shown, the burden of proof to show
that the first marriage was dissolved . . . prior to the second
marriage is on the party whose marriage is under attack."8
*Only selected decisions are considered in this portion of the symposium.
tProfessor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 239 La. 782, 120 So.2d 74 (1960).
2. Id. at 790; 120 So.2d at 77.
3. Ibid.
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Effect of Divorce on Donation in Contemplation of Marriage
In Roy v. Florane4 the wife obtained a divorce on the basis
of separation in fact for two years. The husband reconvened
for the return of a cash donation which he had made to her
before marriage and in contemplation thereof. In disposing of
his claim the court relied principally on Articles 156 and 159
of the Civil Code, under which donations by one spouse to the
other "by the marriage contract or since" must be returned by
the party "against whom" a separation or divorce is pronounced.
Reasoning that the impact of Articles 156 and 159 was that
the party at fault in a separation or divorce should lose the
donation in his or her favor, and observing that a divorce on
the ground of living separate and apart does not raise the issue
of fault, the court concluded that the divorce did not work a
revocation of the donation. Two points may be observed con-
cerning this decison. First, Article 156 refers to donations "by
marriage contract or since," and not generally to donations
made in contemplation of marriage. In the Civil Code of 1808
the reference was to donations "in consideration of their mar-
riage," 5 but this broader language was changed in the Code of
18250 to read as does the present Article 156. Thus a donation
in contemplation of marriage, but not in the marriage contract,
may not come within the provisions of Article 156. Secondly,
Articles 156 and 159 having been written at a time when neither
a separation nor a divorce was obtainable by one at fault in
disrupting the marriage,7 the court properly interpreted them
to mean that the party at fault should lose the donations made
to him or her by the other spouse by marriage contract or since.
But it is at least questionable that the revocation of the donation
be made to depend on whether the separation or divorce is
obtained on grounds implying or not implying fault. This kind
of reasoning used to be employed to allow alimony to the wife,
whether or not at fault, who obtained a divorce on the ground
of separation in fact; but this reasoning seems to have been
abandoned for such alimony cases in McKnight v. Irving
(1956).11 It would have been more consistent, and more just,
to use the rationale of the McKnight decision in the instant case.
4. 239 La. 749, 119 So.2d 849 (1960).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE 34, art. 18 (1808).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 229 (1825).
7. Divorce at the instance of the party at fault in disrupting the marriage
was first allowed by Act 25 of 1898, the antecedent of the present R.S. 9:302.
8. 228 La. 1088, 85 So.2d 1 (1956). This case was discussed by the author in
17 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 308-309 (1957).
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Retrospective Effect of Ameulment to Law of Legitimation
Before 1944 marriage of the parents legitimated previously
born children only if they were acknowledged by both parents
formally before or at the time of the marriage. In 1944 Article
198 of the Civil Code was amended to permit legitimation by
marriage if the parents acknowledged the children formally or
informally, before or after the marriage. In Henry v. Jean9
the court decided that this amendment operated to legitimate
children born before the marriage of their parents in 1900 and
informally acknowledged by both parents before 1930, the date
of their father's death; and, further, because legitimation is
extended even to deceased children for benefit of their issue,10
the issue of one of the these legitimated children who had died
in 1937 could participate as legitimate heirs in the succession
of their grandmother who died in 1949. The decision is rigor-
ously correct in every respect. The 1944 amendment to Article
198 did not operate to alter rights acquired prior to 1944, but
did operate, under the normal rules of construction applicable
to new statutes on the condition or status of persons, to change
the condition of living persons so that they might acquire the
rights attributable to their new condition and accruing after
the effective date of the statute.
Alimony
The decision in Bilello v. Bilellol1 correctly concluded that
under the Louisiana legislation as written the married woman
who claims alimony pending suit for separation need not show
she is unable to earn her living. All that Article 148 of the
Civil Code requires is that she not have sufficient income for
her maintenance. It may be observed, in support of this decision,
that nothing in the Civil Code or other statutes indicates that
a wife or legitimate relative may be denied alimony because he
or she is able to earn his living. Only the illegitimate child is
denied alimony if he can earn his living, and then only if he
has been given sufficient training in a trade or profession to
permit him or her to do s0.12 The wife or legitimate relatives
need only show a lack of income or means, as the case may be,
and the ability of the obligor to pay.13
9. 238 La. 314, 115 So.2d 363 (1959).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 201 (1870).
11. 240 La. 158, 121 So.2d 728 (1960).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 243 (1870).
13. See LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 148, 160, 227, 229, 232 (1870).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code the wife whose husband
has obtained a divorce on the ground of living separate and
apart for two years may receive alimony if she has not been
"at fault." In Rogers v. Lasseigne14 the separate living of the
couple began when the wife packed the husband's clothes and
invited him to leave. At the trial she testified she had taken
this action only after a long period of habitual intemperance
on the part of her husband. The Supreme Court refused to dis-
turb the district judge's finding that she was free from fault.
Assuming that the husband's habitual intemperance was such
as to make their conjugal life insupportable, and therefore to
amount to a cause for separation under Article 138 of the Civil
Code, no fault can be found with the decision. In such a case
the wife has legal justification for leaving her husband, and
there is no substantive difference between her leaving her hus-
band and asking him to leave.15 The decision, however, does
not reproduce the evidence sufficiently to warrant any attempt
here to determine whether the conjugal life of the parties had
been rendered "insupportable" by the intemperance of the hus-
band.
Custody
Dungan v. Dungan" was an appeal from a divorced father's
suit in a district court for custody of his children, then in the
custody of the mother. More than three years having elapsed
since the proceedings in the lower court, the Supreme Court
remanded the case for redetermination of the issue in the light
of later circumstances. In the course of its opinion the court
suggested that under the facts in the record it might be neces-
sary to deny custody to both father and mother in the interest
of the welfare of the children and to make some other dis-
position of them. It must be observed, however, that the only
way in which both father and mother could be deprived of
custody in an action in a district court is through a tutorship
proceeding in which they would be excluded or removed from
the tutorship for cause specified in the legislation. Under R.S.
9:551 the district court could place a child in the custody of
third persons without reference to tutorship if the mental, moral,
14. 239 La. 877, 120 So.2d 462 (1960).
15. Spansenberg v. Carter, 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673 (1922) was based on the
same principle. There the husband was considered justified in leaving his wife
when she calmly and deliberately told him she no longer loved him.
16. 239 La. 733, 119 So.2d 843 (1960).
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or physical welfare of the child required it, but that statute was
repealed by Act 111 of 1956. Proceedings to that effect and
without reference to the tutorship of the child are possible now
only in juvenile court and within the framework of the laws
on neglected children. Perhaps this is not as the law should be,
but it is what the legislation would indicate to be the law.17
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Seashore
The case of Roy v. Board of Commissioners for Pontchar-
train Levee District' was an action by a landowner for damages
for taking property adjacent to' Lake Pontchartrain used for
levee purposes. Lake Pontchartrain has sometimes been consid-
ered as an arm of the sea, and under the Civil Code classifica-
tion of things, seashore is a "common thing" which is not sus-
ceptible of ownership (neither private nor public) but which all
men may freely use.2 If the area in question is seashore, the
adjacent landowner is not entitled to any damages when the
property is used for levee purposes. In a prior litigation, the
court remanded the case while equivocating about the classifica-
tion of the body of water.8 In the present suit, the levee board's
defense rested largely on the proposed definition of seashore as
"that land normally covered by the highest tides of the year."'4
(Emphasis added.) The court refused to accept this because it
differs from the Civil Code boundary of seashore at "the highest
water during the winter season." (Emphasis added.) However,
"conceding defendant's contention to be sound,"6 the court was
not impressed with the defendant's evidence, and affirmed an
award in favor of the plaintiff.
Does this treatment of the problem mean inferentially that
17. See the author's comments on the effect of the repeal of R.S. 9:551 in 17
LOuISIANA LAw REVIEW 26-27 (1956).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 926, 117 So.2d 60 (1960).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450, 451 (1870).
3. Roy v. Board of Commissioners for Pontchartrain Levee District, 237 La.
541, 111 So.2d 765 (1959) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1958-1959 T'erm -Property, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 216 (1960).
4. 238 La. 926, 932, 117 So.2d 60, 62 (1960).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 451 (1870).
6. 238 La. 926, 932, 117 So.2d 60, 62 (1960).
